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The current international tax system diverges greatly from a theoretically “optimal” tax 
system. One reason for this discrepancy may be that politicians strive for other objectives rather than 
making tax rules that comply with the theoretical concepts of optimal taxation. In this article, I 
overview the approaches used in the economic and legal literature to explain the motivations of the 
people making international tax policy and contrast them with observations from the “real world”. 
This article illustrates that the making of international tax policy is affected by many different factors: 
domestic pressure groups and the structure of the international tax system, along with self-
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international tax policy is made, it is not astonishing that international tax law deviates from the 
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1. Introduction  
International tax rules are frequently criticized as violating the principles of efficiency, equity, 
and simplicity. This observation raises the question as to where the divergence between ideal and 
“real-world” tax rules originates. The hypothesis of this article is that this discrepancy is inter alia 
caused by the fact that the politicians making international tax rules actually do not seek to create 
“ideal” rules in the light of tax theory but rather have other objectives in mind. It is quite evident that 
“it cannot simply be assumed that actors pursue the goals of equity and efficiency per se” (Rixen, 
2008: 83).  
But what goals do politicians strive for? This article overviews the approaches used in the 
economic and legal literature to explain the motivations behind those people who make 
international tax policy, contrasting them with some “real world” observations. The purpose is to 
show that the motivations of those involved in international tax policy contribute to the inefficiency, 
inequity, and complexity of the international tax system.  
The article proceeds as follows. After having explicated the characteristics of international 
tax policy (Section 2), I will elucidate in more detail the theoretical principles that international tax 
rules should comply with (Section 3). Subsequently, alternative explanations of the objectives of 
international tax policy will be presented and analyzed with regard to their relevance in explaining 
international tax rules as we see them in the real world (Section 4). Specifically, I will examine the 
propositions that fundamental principles of tax policy (4.1), global efficiency norms (4.2), and 
national welfare (4.3) may be the main objectives for politicians involved in making international tax 
policy. Subsequently, I will investigate – in the light of Public Choice Theory – the influence of 
different societal groups on the law making process (4.4). Finally, I will talk about the Game Theory 
framework, which can prove valuable in modeling strategic interactions of different countries in the 
international tax game (4.5). The article ends with a brief conclusion (Section 5).  
 
2. International tax policy  
In the course of the global integration of economic activities since World War II, corporations 
have increasingly engaged in cross-border activities. As a result of the growing international business 
and capital flows, the national tax regimes have also become more and more interrelated 
(Bovenberg, 1994: 1). Virtually all jurisdictions hence have established a policy framework laying 
down how (i) foreign-source income earned by their residents is taxed, and how (ii) income of non-
residents derived from within their territory is taxed. To these purely domestic rules, there is the 
addition of “complementary rules” which are primarily stipulated in tax treaties and may override 
3 
 
domestic rules (Brauner, 2003: 265). These three sets of rules are at the core of international 
taxation, which may accordingly be defined as  
 
“the body of legal provisions of different countries that covers the tax aspects of cross-
border transactions” (Holmes, 2007: 2).  
 
Conversely, most scholars1 agree that the term “international tax” is in some sense “a 
misnomer” as national governments largely maintain their sovereignty in tax matters (Rixen, 2008: 2) 
and there is “no overriding international law of taxation” (Li, 2003: 31).  
The European Union is the remarkable exception in this respect (Holmes, 2007: 3). In order 
to achieve the proper functioning of the common market, the European Union has strived to 
eliminate all obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, and persons (Terra and Wattel, 2001: 
30). As different national tax systems may impede the working of the internal market, an integration 
of each nation’s tax laws – at least to a certain extent – is vital (ibid). Albeit direct taxation being in 
principle still in the hands of the Member States, the Council has thus harmonized some aspects of 
cross-border taxation2 (Adamczyk, 2010: 23ff).  
Apart from the supranational aspects of the tax systems in the European Union, international 
taxation generally consists of three institutional layers (Rixen, 2008). First, governments unilaterally 
set international tax rules that intend to prevent both double taxation (such as the tax exemption or 
credit method for foreign-source income) and undertaxation (such as controlled-foreign-company 
(CFC), thin capitalization, or transfer pricing rules). Second, governments agree to bilateral double tax 
treaties (DTTs) that also aim at eliminating double taxation and at preventing tax evasion. 
Multilateral coordination in forums specialized in international tax issues constitutes the third layer. 
Of special importance is the cooperation within the framework of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN), which both issue model tax 
conventions.  Even though these conventions do not have legal force, they are highly relevant as they 
form the basis of virtually all bilateral DTTs (Rixen, 2008). In particular, the OECD constitutes a central 
“institutionalized forum for tax policy” for the multilateral sharing of information and experience, as 
well as for the setting of topics, e.g. through the project on “harmful tax coordination” (ibid: 84f). 
With this institutional setting in mind, I will now turn to focus on the possible objectives of 
international tax policy.  
                                                            
1 See for instance M. Graetz, D.Rosenbloom, J. Roin, M.Kane, and T. Dagan. Conversely, R. Avi-Yonah claims that the 
domestic tax laws and the tax treaty network actually form an international tax system. This system is potent in the sense 
that it is difficult for countries to unilaterally change their international tax policies in a way that collides with the principles 
of the established international tax system, i.e. the single tax principle and the benefits principle (Avi-Yonah, 2007: 1). 
2 The Council thus has issued the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Merger Directive, Interest and Royalties Directive, Mutual 
Assistance Directive, Recovery Assistance Directive, and Savings Directive (Adamczyk, 2010: 25f). 
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3. The discrepancy between ideal tax rules and “real world”  
international tax rules  
There is a broad agreement among scholars and politicians alike that efficiency, fairness, and 
simplicity represent the principles that should govern international tax policy. As Graetz puts it in his 
David R. Tillinghast lecture in 2001:  
 
“Since Adam Smith it has been commonplace to say that a tax system should be fair, 
economically efficient, and reasonably easy to administer and comply with” (p. 294).  
 
A tax system is regarded as efficient if it impacts as little as possible the decision-making 
processes of market participants (Terra and Wattel, 2001: 30). Investors’ decisions are said to be 
most efficient when they are based solely on pure economic criteria and are not distorted. That is, in 
the sense that the pre-tax ranking of alternative investments differs from the ranking of the same 
alternatives when taxation is taken into account (ibid). The exception to this general rule are 
Pigouvian taxes, that aim at correcting market imperfections caused by externalities, and thus 
precisely seek to change people’s behavior (Case, 1986: 121f). Fairness  or tax equity  comprises of 
two aspects: taxpayers with a similar ability to pay should be subject to a similar tax burden 
(horizontal equity), while taxpayers with different resources or incomes should incur a different tax 
treatment (vertical equity) (Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2011: 144). Moreover, a tax system should 
comprise of simplicity, in the sense that it consists of enforceable tax rules and entails low 
administrative and compliance costs. “Neutrality”, i.e. “similar tax burdens on similar individuals or 
business activities”, is another commonly postulated feature of an ideal tax system, which is in line 
with efficiency, horizontal equity (i.e. fairness), and simplicity (ibid).  
However, when we look at the “real world” tax rules, we see quite the contrary to what is 
postulated in theoretical debates. The impact that tax rules have on economic decisions of taxpayers 
is ubiquitous (Graetz, 2001). Taxpayers arrange their affairs in order to take advantage of some rules 
or to circumvent others.  
The flows of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI) to the 
United States (U.S.) illustrate this well. As of 2008, four among the top ten source countries of equity 
FPI flows into the U.S. were jurisdictions often characterized as tax havens (Switzerland, Cayman 
Islands, Singapore, and Bermuda) (Hanlon et al., 2012: 33). Furthermore, tax haven jurisdictions such 
as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, Netherlands Antilles and Bahamas were the countries with the 
highest equity FPI flows to the U.S. in relation to the size of their populations (ibid). Moreover, the 
figures of FDI flowing to the U.S. reveal that after Switzerland and the United Kingdom, Luxembourg 
was the most important source of FDI flows into the U.S. as of 2010 (OECD, 2010). The amount of FDI 
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flows stemming from Luxembourg was almost as large as the amount that originated from Canada 
and France combined (ibid). Such numbers are certainly also a result of tax considerations (Graetz, 
2001: 267). Albeit these Luxembourgian FDI flows may reflect mainly the virtual shifting of activities, 
this triggers substantive costs related for example to the underlying paper shuffling or the round-
tripping of funds. Moreover, economic research has reached a consensus that tax considerations also 
impact cross-border investment flows, and thus affect also actual economic activities such as the 
relocation of factories (see e.g. De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003 and 2006; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; 
Devereux, 2007; Morisset and Pirnia, 1999).  
Rather than associating with the claim for simplicity, the complexity of the international tax 
system is rather more commonplace (Shaviro, forthcoming, Chapter II: 1). The highly complex 
international tax rules of the U.S. trigger planning and compliance costs that are “disproportionately 
high relative to their role in the activities of the corporation” and “extremely high relative to the 
revenue raised by the U.S. government on this income” (Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1996: 48).  
The complexity of the international tax system also impacts the equity (fairness) between 
taxpayers. Only very few citizens would call the international tax system “fair” (see e.g. Hufbauer and 
Kim, 2009, or Puzzanghera, 2011). It is often regarded as unfair simply because few people can truly 
understand it, and those that can take advantage of the complexity of the system, for instance, 
wealthy private persons hiring talented tax lawyers or large corporations with their tax planning 
departments can save a great deal of their tax debt as compared to others that do not have such 
resources (Kirchhof, 2011). Also, purely domestic corporations recurrently complain about the 
unfairness of the international tax system. As a result of tax arbitrage opportunities offered by the 
interplay between different tax systems home and abroad, numerous tax avoidance opportunities, 
such as deferral of the repatriation of taxable income, profit-shifting, or tax treaty shopping, are 
available options for multinational enterprises (MNEs), providing them with “unfair” advantages in 
comparison with purely domestic firms (e.g. Holmes, 2007, Rixen, 2008: 82f, Shaviro, forthcoming, 
Ch. I: 2). Overall, as Rixen puts it:  
 
“Even a cursory look suffices to show the actual rules of international taxation are not in line 
with the normative ideals of international tax theory” (2008: 82).  
 
The actual international tax system thus has little in common with the postulated “optimal” 
tax system. One reason for this might be that politicians actually strive for other goals than to make 
tax rules fulfilling theoretical concepts of optimal taxation. Evidently, there are other issues that 
contribute a great deal to the inefficiency, unfairness, and complexity of the international tax system. 
Already inbuilt features such as the realization requirement (Potter, 1999), income taxation instead 
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of say a lump-sum tax (Nicodème, 2008: 2), or entity-level taxation (Shaviro, forthcoming, Ch. II: 3) 
lead to considerable troubles. This article posits that the politicians’ motivations also add to the 
problems of the international tax system (also see Shaviro, forthcoming: Ch. III: 16). In the following, I 
will present the approaches of legal and economic writers attempting to explain politicians’ 
objectives.  
 
4. Alternative explanations of the objectives of the persons involved in 
international tax policy  
The motivations governing politicians are wide-reaching and diverse. First, I will examine in 
how far the two fundamental principles of tax policy, the benefit principle and the ability-to-pay 
principle, might be regarded as guiding lights for politicians when making international tax rules.  
4.1 The benefit and ability-to-pay principles  
The two fundamental normative principles in tax theory are the benefit principle and the 
ability-to-pay principle (Schön, 2009: 71). According to Julie Roin (2001), the benefit principle 
constitutes the most appropriate way in which to think of the corporate tax (in Shaviro, 2011: 75). 
This principle proposes that the tax a corporation pays should be viewed as a compensation for the 
benefits that the corporation obtains from the jurisdiction in which it operates, such as security, 
police services, or infrastructure (Schön, 2009: 75). In reality, however, we observe that the tax 
burden of corporations does not depend on the support received by the state but rather on the 
amount of income generated.  
The ability-to-pay principle postulates that a taxpayer should contribute to society according 
to his or her consumption power (Schön, 2009: 71). In the context of corporate taxation, this 
principle frequently is interpreted that a corporation’s tax burden is based on its total net income.  
However, both source and residence taxation methods violate this principle (Rixen, 2008: 82). Source 
taxation usually takes into account only the income generated within the jurisdiction and not the 
corporation’s total income (McLure, 2000: 6: 4f, in Rixen, 2008: 82). Residence taxation following the 
exemption method goes against the ability-to-pay principle, as foreign-source income is exempted 
from the tax base in the residence country, even though it augments the ability-to-pay as much as 
domestic income. The same is true for the credit method when deferral of income generated abroad 
is allowed (Rixen, 2008: 82). Fundamental features such as the calculation of the corporate income 
tax burden based on the profits earned or the concepts of source and residence taxation infringe the 
benefit and the ability-to-pay principles. It could hence be concluded that these doctrines were 
probably not the main guidelines when the structure of the international tax system was established.  
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4.2 Global efficiency norms  
Global efficiency norms form a large part of the discussion of international tax policy. 
Domestic tax policy debates usually are dominated by the insight that both efficiency and equity 
should be the goals of tax policy. Analyses in international taxation conversely start very often from 
the assumption that maximizing global efficiency3 constitutes the appropriate policy objective 
(Graetz, 2001: 270).  
Economists have developed various norms that, if followed by politicians, are regarded to 
advance global economic efficiency. The two oldest and thus far most influential ones are Capital 
Export Neutrality (CEN) and Capital Import Neutrality (CIN), which were introduced by Peggy 
Musgrave (née Richman) in the 1960s (Richman, 1963; Musgrave, 1969). These two neutralities have 
shaped the debate so deeply that they are said to “span the normative universe” of international 
taxation, and a great deal of the discussion deals only with the question as to which of the two is 
preferable (Graetz, 2001: 271).4 Desai and Hines (2003) added the Capital Ownership Neutrality 
(CON) to the “soup of neutralities” – as dubbed by Shaviro (forthcoming, Ch. I: 6). The idea 
underlying these norms is that if they were fulfilled, capital would be allocated most efficiently 
globally and investors would potentially obtain the highest possible yield on their investments 
(Holmes, 2007: 13).  
On the one hand, CEN postulates that foreign-source income and domestically generated 
income should be subject to the same effective tax burden, so that the tax system does not favor one 
type of income over the other (Schön, 2009: 79). That is, CEN claims that taxpayers should fall under 
the same effective domestic tax rate regardless of whether they derive their income from at home or 
abroad. It is commonly assumed that worldwide taxation of investors in their home country would be 
most suitable to realize CEN (Holmes, 2007: 11).  
CIN, on the other hand, strives to achieve neutrality from the perspective of the host state 
(Schön, 2009: 79). Both domestic and foreign investors should face the same effective tax rates on 
income derived in the host country. This neutrality is generally thought to comply with a territorial 
tax system that exempts foreign-source income (ibid).  
CON, finally, “pleads for a tax system where the transfer of an investment to a new investor 
is not distorted by a tax wedge” (ibid: 81). This neutrality is put into effect with either pure source-
taxation or pure residence-taxation by all jurisdictions (ibid). As opposed to the two above-
mentioned neutralities, CON takes into account that the return on an investment may vary according 
to the investors. For instance, a MNE being able to take advantage of certain economies of scale may 
                                                            
3 Global welfare, or global economic efficiency, is in this framework defined as the sum of global tax revenues and firm 
profits (Schön, 2009: 83). 
4 As concerns to the theoretical request for neutrality, there is no agreement as to whether CIN or CEN is the better 
concept of neutrality. The coexistence of both exemption and credit method does not lead to any sort of neutrality (Schön, 
2009). 
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extract a higher yield from a specific investment than a smaller company might do (ibid). One 
considerable advantage to this approach when compared to the CEN and CIN methods is that the 
CON method brings the ideas of the theory of the firm (as pioneered by Dunning, 1977) into the 
theory of international business taxation (Shaviro, forthcoming, Ch. I: 8). However, all the above 
mentioned neutralities5 share some problematic features: 
 
“Each of these efficiency norms describes a single margin of choice at which (all else equal) 
the tax system ought to be neutral, so taxpayers will make choices at that margin based on 
pre-tax profitability. This is a common efficiency standard, reflecting that taxes paid are a 
cost from the taxpayer’s standpoint but a transfer from the social standpoint, given that 
someone else will get the benefit of using the revenues. None of these rival acronyms even 
purports to address the full efficiency picture, much less to incorporate equity concerns. Yet 
each, according to proponents, ostensibly determines, all by itself, the answer to a whole set 
of international tax policy questions” (Shaviro, forthcoming, Ch. III: 2).  
 
This means that from a normative standpoint none of these neutralities is desirable as the 
only guiding principle in the complex international tax system, even though this is exactly what their 
proponents often assert.6 In the light of these arguments, I will turn to the question as to whether 
there is any evidence or it is conceivable that these global efficiency norms guide politicians when 
making the rules of international tax policy in practice.  
U.S. international tax policy  
Looking back at the 1920s, when the structure of the U.S. and the international income tax 
systems came into being, we clearly see that global efficiency norms did not play a very important 
role in academic and political discussions at that time (Graetz, 2001: 275). Practical issues, such as 
the administering, enforcing and collecting of taxes were more influential. Moreover, considerations 
regarding fairness among taxpayers also had a role to play. The claim for source taxation, for 
instance, was mainly motivated by fairness and not so much by efficiency considerations, as opposed 
to current tax policies where CIN usually constitutes the normative basis for territorial tax systems 
(Graetz, 2001: 298). Similarly, the foreign tax credit was not introduced for reasons of efficiency (to 
comply with CEN as would probably be asserted today), but for “mercantilist reasons”, that is in 
                                                            
5 This holds also for the neutralities striving to promote national welfare addressed in section 4.3. 
6 There are also other arguments against the use of these global efficiency norms as guidelines for international tax policy, 
e.g. problems in the strict underlying assumptions. Musgrave’s analysis is based on perfectly competitive markets; 
externalities and economies of scale or scope are assumed away; domestic and foreign investments are deemed to be 
substitutes; the global capital stock s assumed to be fix; individual taxes are entirely ignored; the analysis confined to 
outbound investment, while inbound investment is ignored; and also reactions of other governments are ignored (Graetz, 
2001: 287ff). 
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order to support U.S. companies to invest and do business abroad (Graetz, 2004: 210; Graetz and 
O’Hear, 1997: 1045ff). It is fair to deduce, therefore, that at the beginnings of the international tax 
system, national welfare considerations drove the decision makers much more than concerns about 
global welfare. This does however not mean to suggest that the particular players were altruistic 
about their decisions when it was in conflict with their own personal benefit. 
Also in later years, considerations other than those for global efficiency frequently drove the 
modifications of the international tax policy framework. For instance, it is often claimed that the tax 
proposals made by the Kennedy Administration in 1962 had intended to implement CEN as the 
foundation of the U.S. international tax system (Graetz, 2001: 275). However, as Graetz (2001) 
illustrates, when examined more closely, the Administration’s proposals were not fully in line with 
CEN principles. Nevertheless, Congress did not endorse the Kennedy Administration’s proposals, 
instead, the subpart F rules7 were adopted. This is generally seen as the beginning of the “U.S. 
international tax policy as compromise between CEN and CIN” (ibid: 275). Moreover, at the same 
time, measures aiming at fostering domestic U.S. investment were enacted (ibid). This is clearly 
evidence that for both the Kennedy Administration and the Congress, global efficiency norms were 
not primary policy goals. Rather, the rules proposed and passed in 1962 indicate that politicians were 
more interested in promoting national economic performance (ibid).  
It should be noted that the global efficiency norms are not only invoked for altruistic 
motivations. Frequently, people pursuing their own interests put forward these efficiency norms to 
back up their cause (Shaviro, forthcoming; Ch. III: 15). U.S. Multinationals wishing to boost outbound 
investment appeal to CIN on the grounds of “international competitiveness”. In the United Kingdom 
(U.K.), the move from the credit towards the exemption system was spurred by business interests in 
view of the unilateral goal to advance the attractiveness of the U.K. for businesses (ibid).  
Tax treaty policy  
When considering tax treaties between countries, it is often suggested that promoting global 
efficiency is the main motive for signing them. It is commonly accepted that one of the purposes of a 
tax treaty is to reduce international double taxation and thus to promote the free movement of 
persons, capital and goods and capital – thereby encouraging an efficient global allocation of 
resources (Dagan, 2000). Conversely, double taxation can also be effectively alleviated by unilateral 
measures. There is also a further motive for signing DTTs: to diminish the opportunities for tax 
avoidance and evasion, inter alia encouraging enhanced information exchange (see e.g. Davies, 2003: 
260f).  
                                                            
7 Generally, income earned by U.S. residents abroad only becomes taxable in the U.S. when it is repatriated. There are, 
however, some exceptions to that rule, notably the so-called subpart F rules. This set of rules identifies certain foreign-
source types of income that are subject to taxation in the U.S. as soon as they arise – even if not repatriated (Shaviro, 
forthcoming: 44f). 
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Tsilly Dagan (2000) claims that residence countries do not strike DTTs because they are 
concerned with fostering global efficiency, rather they are interested in boosting national tax 
revenues. In her paper, which examines different ways of relieving international double taxation, she 
demonstrates that DTTs are not needed to prevent international double taxation. Preventing double 
taxation unilaterally is a stable equilibrium. She argues that the difference between unilateral double 
tax alleviation and double tax relief by means of a DTT is only that with a DTT a residence country 
gets a larger share of the tax revenues on the cross-border income (also see 4.5). Dagan thus 
concludes that besides mitigating bureaucratic difficulties and offering the signatory states a 
platform to harmonize their tax concepts, DTTs in fact redistribute tax revenues from source states 
to residence states. This claim may be supported by the fact that DTTs tend to be more common 
between peer countries with similar economic interests.  
From the above information it is clear that considerations for global welfare have not been 
the primary driving forces in international tax policy. Rather, it appears much more convincing that 
also national welfare concerns have motivated decision makers. This national welfare argument will 
be examined in the next section.  
4.3 National welfare  
What stands behind the concept of “national welfare”? Do politicians really strive to 
maximize national welfare as has been asserted above? Numerous authors assume that governments 
seek to promote their own national interests rather than global welfare (e.g. Rixen, 2008, 2011; 
Graetz, 2001; Shaviro, 2011; Holmes, 2007).  
Economists tend to (over)simplify the matter and commonly equate economic welfare with a 
country’s gross national product (GDP), i.e. the sum of investment, consumption, government 
spending, and net exports (see e.g. Blanchard, 2010). Due to discontentment with the traditional 
indicators such as GDP, how to measure a nation’s economic performance has received great interest 
in the current literature to date.8 Nevertheless, the question as to what “national welfare” comprises 
of is in the end a philosophical question. I do not, however, want to delve into this debate but rather 
look at how economic models of international taxation operationalize national welfare.  
National efficiency  
A great deal of the literature on international taxation posits that governments generally 
strive to advance the national economic efficiency. This strand has developed various national 
efficiency norms similar to the global efficiency norms described above, known as National Neutrality 
(NN), National Ownership Neutrality (NON), and Global Portfolio Neutrality (GPN).  
                                                            
8 The most noted contribution to this recent debate probably comes from the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress, which had been created by the French government and charged to think about 
new ways of measuring economic and social development (http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm). 
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NN  developed by Peggy Musgrave (1963) as a complement to CEN and CIN models  claims 
that national welfare maximization is achieved if income generated abroad is taxed at the full 
domestic rate and the taxes paid abroad are simply deductible like any other expenses for 
corporations (Shaviro, 2011: 75ff). This approach to dealing with foreign source income cannot, 
however, be observed in real world. It simply does not occur. One reason may be that governments 
want to support “their” MNEs so to be successful in the world markets. Thus, home-grown MNEs are 
not burdened with the heavy tax debt implied by the NN principle but rather are granted tax credits 
unilaterally (Schön, 2009: 84).  
NON9, asserts that if a corporation’s income generated abroad is exempted from domestic 
taxation, the corporation would strive to maximize the profitability of both its foreign and domestic 
assets (Desai and Hines, 2003: 496; Hines 2009: 278 in Shaviro, forthcoming, Ch. III: 45). If only this 
source-taxation is realized, distortions are minimized and national welfare maximized.  
Even though NN and NON may appear similar, they differ fundamentally. While NN ensures 
that overall tax distortions for taxpayers are minimized, NON “is about eliminating tax distortions at 
one margin and ignoring the fact that they still exist at other margins and that efficiency ought to 
dictate minimizing the sum” (Shaviro, forthcoming, Ch. III: 46).  
While the neutrality principles explained above target cross-border investment by MNEs, 
GPN, developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2009) is a policy norm that claims an efficient tax 
treatment of Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). This framework takes into account that FPI (as 
opposed to FDI) is motivated mainly by considerations regarding risk and portfolio diversification 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009: 4). It is assumed by Desai and Dharmapala that governments strive to 
foster national welfare, which comprises of three aspects: the expected end-of-period wealth of the 
US investor, the risk borne by the investor to attain expected wealth and, the tax revenue collected 
by the government (ibid: 19).  
Objectives of the government in economic models  
In economic models, there are two extreme assumptions regarding what governments strive 
for (Fuest et al., 2005). On the one end of the spectrum, there is the assumption of the benevolent 
government, i.e. a government maximizing the welfare of its citizens, and on the other end, the 
government as a leviathan, i.e. a government seeking to maximize tax revenues with little interest in 
the well-being of its citizens. Models based on the assumption of a benevolent government reason 
national welfare as the welfare of a representative citizen in the said country. Models following the 
leviathan approach, stemming from the so-called Public Choice approach (see below), model national 
                                                            
9 This principle was also developed by Desai and Hines (2003). 
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welfare as the sum of tax revenues and hence explicitly picture the risk that governments may 
become oversized (ibid).  
How so often in life, the reality often lies between these two extremes. It is rather doubtful 
that a government is solely interested in improving its citizens’ welfare. As voters have a certain 
influence on the government’s actions via elections it is highly unlikely that a government can simply 
accumulate tax revenues without benefit for the citizen (Fuest et al., 2005). Consequently, many 
models include both aims into the government’s objective function (for examples, see Fuest et al., 
2005). Also the various neutralities explained above (CEN, CIN, CON, NON, NN, GNP) follow a similar 
approach that conceptualizes efficiency (and in this respect, welfare) as the sum of tax revenues and 
firm profits (Schön, 2009: 83).  
4.4 Public Choice Theory  
Public Choice Theory is an approach applying methods typically used in economics to the 
political sphere; particularly, it adopts the economists’ view that individuals are selfish utility-
maximizers to political actors (Tullock, 1987). Public Choice models hint to a further key issue in the 
context of international taxation, namely pointing out the interrelatedness of economics and politics. 
The Public Choice framework further highlights that a nation is not so homogenous as to have one 
common interest, but rather that nations comprise of different societal groups with particular (and 
often conflicting) interests (Olson, 1982).  
In the U.S., as in other countries alike, tax policy is very much impacted by the interests of various 
factions:  
 
“… tax policy is a plaything of interest group politics, of ideological divisions related to 
progressivity and the size of the government, and of the games played by politicians to 
extract rents or improve the political optics of what they are doing” (Shaviro, 2007: 165).  
 
In the Public Choice framework, bureaucrats and politicians are viewed as being concerned 
only about their own interests: bureaucrats aim at boosting the budgets they manage, increasing 
their incomes, or enhancing their personal status (Benvenisti, 1999: 199). Politicians typically do not 
seek to improve the welfare of their citizens but only seek to be (re)elected. Hence, they are likely to 
provide advantages to influential pressure groups that support the “correct” political party, for 
instance, by donating to their political campaigns (ibid: 172). In such a view of the world, there is not 
much room for politicians that maximize national welfare.  
Being aware that nation states are not unitary actors alludes to the influence that various 
factions have on international tax policy (Olson, 1986). In the following, I will look at the different 
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societal groups, their specific interests with regards to international taxation, and how they influence 
the policies of their respective governments.  
Public Choice Theory has shown that with respect to domestic issues, relatively small and 
well-organized groups (commonly producers and employers) are typically more successful than 
larger groups are in influencing politics in their favor (Olson, 1986: 74). That this also applies to 
international tax policy is not surprising. Shaviro highlights that powerful domestic interest groups 
such as “the cadre of notoriously well financed and politically active leading U.S. MNEs [are] lobbying 
for policies that would benefit them in particular”, and exert a great influence on international tax 
policy in the U.S. (Shaviro, forthcoming, Ch. III, p. 16).  
The OECD’s “harmful tax competition project”  
The history of the OECD’s “harmful tax competition project” is one prominent example of 
MNEs successfully influencing international tax policy (Rixen, 2011: 215). The project was initially 
intended to (i) induce low-tax jurisdiction to put an end to “harmful” tax policies and (ii) to persuade 
high-tax jurisdictions to eliminate preferential tax regimes (ibid). The fact that pervasive tax 
competition shifts the tax burden from mobile factors (such as international capital) to those less 
mobile (labor and consumption), is stated as one reason why “excessive” tax competition is seen as 
harmful (OECD, 1998: nb 66). From the initial OECD report from 1998 it becomes also evident that 
the interests of corporate capital are regarded as the driving force behind international tax 
competition (ibid: 16f).  
Despite the intentions written down in this 1998 report and despite being allegedly 
concerned about excessive forms of tax competition threatening their domestic tax-bases, the 
governments of the G7 did not implement any severe rules in order to inhibit “harmful” tax 
competition (Benvenisti, 1999). According to Benvenisti, the reason is that governments do not want 
to harm their “own” international corporations. In the U.S., the lobbying activities of the pressure 
groups were particularly successful. In 2001, Paul O’Neill, then Secretary of the Treasury, announced 
that:  
 
“The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates 
or tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax 
systems”.  
 
Furthermore, it is not only residence countries of MNEs, but also tax-havens that benefit 
from the status-quo of the international tax system. Both parties were opposed to this OECD project 
(Rixen, 2005: 25ff). Under this pressure, the project’s goals have to some degree been amended. The 
OECD’s 2001 progress report on the project documents a shift in the project’s objectives (OECD, 
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2001). The project should henceforth merely focus on the criterion of transparency and the exchange 
of information between jurisdictions (OECD, 2001: nb 26f; also see 4.5).  
Tax treaty policy  
In addition, Benvenisti (1999) argues that small and well-organized interest groups are able 
to exert even greater influence on international than on domestic law (p. 174). This is especially true 
for negotiations of international treaties. The negotiations are rather secret; the options offered and 
discussed remain largely concealed to the public. Due to the relative confidentiality of international 
negotiations and the resulting high costs of information-gathering and assessment, political 
stakeholders with relatively good organizational capabilities have a comparative advantage in taking 
influence (ibid). The general public, in contrast, is often ignorant of the ramifications of international 
treaties (ibid: 180). Moreover, negotiations are usually made by government representatives.  
Parliaments can only approve or disapprove the treaty that they are presented, and thus have 
essentially only a “take it or leave it” option. As a result, international treaties are “less susceptible to 
serious domestic scrutiny and effective democratic deliberation” (ibid: 185f). This leads to well-
organized pressure groups being able to secure significant gains and “voters [facing] a process of 
ever-growing marginalization” (ibid: 212).  
These general observations apply to a varying degree also to tax treaties, depending on each 
individual country’s policies.10 The Austrian administration with regards to DTT policy, for instance, 
increasingly leaves the secretiveness out of its chambers (Lang, 2012). In 1998, the Austrian model 
tax treaty was published and, since then, publications of the experts from the Ministry of Finance 
have openly discussed the further developments of the national tax treaty policy (ibid: 123). The 
Austrian administration actively seeks out collaboration with interest groups and academics (ibid: 
124f).  
Yet, surprisingly, both the general principles and the practical details of tax treaty policy are 
commonly not discussed in the Austrian parliament. Except for special cases like the revision of the 
DTT with Switzerland in 2007, the parliamentary approval of international tax treaties rarely gives 
rise to public debate (ibid: 124). Lang maintains that since DTT policy is not a minor part of tax policy 
it would be appropriate to follow the example of other countries such as Germany, who regularly 
discuss the topic at the parliamentary level (124).  
While the parliament and the general public are not much involved in international tax 
policy, Austrian interest groups are strongly integrated in the negotiation process of DTTs (ibid: 124). 
After each round of negotiations, as well as after the conclusion of the process, special interest 
                                                            
10 A very thoroughly researched and detailed paper examining the Australian tax treaty practice, particularly giving 
background information on what the negotiating parties offered and discussed and providing explanations as to how the 
particular features of the Australian DTTs evolved over time, is the recent paper by C. Taylor (2011). 
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groups and academic experts are informed and invited to give their comments. The representative 
for Austrian companies, the Austrian Economic Chamber (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich), is 
informally consulted also during negotiations (ibid). Whether the opinions of experts and the 
pressure groups have a substantial influence on the Austrian position is however difficult to tell (ibid: 
124).  
Akin to Benvenisti (1999), Lang states that secretiveness with regards to preparing 
international treaties is outdated – especially when it comes to DTTs, which are not only part of 
foreign policy but also part of fiscal policy (Lang, 2012: 25). It seems paradoxical that in a political 
culture where public and controversial discussions concerning tax policy are the norm, DTTs are not 
debated publicly. From a democratic perspective, it is alarming that only pressure groups and specific 
expert institutions are involved in the negotiation process of DTTs (ibid: 21).  
4.5 Game Theory framework  
With the growing international connectedness of economies, the tax systems of nation states 
are also becoming increasingly interrelated. A country seeking to maximize its welfare by structuring 
its tax system in one way or another has also to take into consideration how other countries tax 
cross-border income. Game Theory provides a valuable framework for modeling these strategic 
interactions (see e.g. Janeba, 1995). A game that is commonly viewed as aptly representing the 
strategic dependencies and relations in international taxation is the so-called prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) (ibid). Snidal (1985) describes this game as  
 
“an archetypical example of the disjuncture between individual and group rationality which 
characterizes many problems of collective action: Pursuit of individual selfinterest by states 
(…) results in their being worse off than if both abstain from pursuit of their narrow self-
interest and cooperate(…)”(p. 926).  
 
Numerous authors apply this PD-framework for analyzing different aspects of international 
taxation (see e.g. Shaviro, 1997; Dagan, 2000; Rixen, 2005). It is, for instance, often argued that 
curbing tax competition is difficult, because the positions of each country can be modeled as a PD-
game where defection hampers cooperation (e.g. Rixen, 2005). When all governments cooperate and 
convincingly commit to refraining from undercutting each other’s tax rates, then collectively, the 
best outcome would result. Yet for each country individually, it is optimal to defect, i.e. reducing its 
tax rates in order to attract mobile capital. If all governments, however, pursue this strategy, the 
worst result for all occurs: tax rates of all countries would decrease and no additional tax bases from 
abroad would be secured (ibid: 7). This scenario reflects a symmetric PD. However, it is often 
asserted that both small and big countries have differing interests with regards to tax competition 
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(Dehejia and Genschel, 1999). As declining tax rates are connected with large welfare losses for big 
countries, they are more interested in international coordination in order to prevent a race to the 
bottom of tax rates. Small countries, contrarily, being able “to overcompensate the potential welfare 
loss of lower taxes with the influx of tax base from other countries” would rather welcome tax 
competition (Rixen, 2011: 202). Due to this conflict of interests, international tax competition is 
regarded by some as being more aptly modeled through an asymmetric PD-game.  
Tsilly Dagan (2000) uses the Game Theory framework to analyze another issue of 
international taxation. By means of a PD-game, she determines whether a country, striving to 
maximize national welfare would be better off either eliminating double taxation of cross-border 
income unilaterally or signing a DTT for this purpose. In her model, national welfare comprises of tax 
revenues and the aspired level of outbound investment. Dagan concludes that if the cross-border 
investment flows between the two countries are symmetric, both countries will eliminate double 
taxation. Whether this is done unilaterally or by a DTT is irrelevant. The result changes, however, if 
the relations between the countries are asymmetric, i.e. that one country is a net capital importer 
and the other country is a net capital exporter. In this case, it is in the source country’s national 
interest to eliminate double taxation unilaterally, as its tax revenues are higher under unilateral relief 
than under a relief by means of a DTT (see also 4.2). Unilateral double tax relief is a stable 
equilibrium, also when both countries are assumed to promote their own welfare.  
Thomas Rixen (2008) also models the strategic interactions of two countries in relieving 
double taxation and preventing tax avoidance. He states that depending on the assumptions, this 
game may take either the form of a PD or an assurance game11. He assumes that both countries 
strive to maximize national welfare (which comprises of national tax revenues and investment 
outflows) and that no double tax relief would be granted in the initial situation. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that the source country always taxes the income arising on its territory. The residence 
country can then choose between exemption/credit, deduction, or no double tax relief. It is generally 
agreed in the literature that for the residence country unilaterally providing relief for double taxation 
is welfare-maximizing (Rixen, 2008: 34).  
If one assumes that an economy’s capital is (i) not fixed, (ii) that domestic investment and 
FDI are complements, and (iii) that capital flows in two directions, multiple Nash-equilibria12 are 
possible (see e.g. Janeba, 1995). The credit and the exemption relief, as well as the deduction 
method, can represent a Nash-equilibrium (Rixen, 2008: 37). That is, based on the underlying 
assumptions, the choice between credit/exemption and deduction is represented not by a PD but 
rather by an assurance game, where more than one equilibrium is possible (ibid). So far, there is no 
                                                            
11 The characteristic feature of these games is that “the players have to assure each other of their rationality” (Rixen, 2008: 
37). 
12 That is, each person makes the best decision she can make - taking into account what the other person does. 
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consensus in the literature as to whether the choice for the residence country between deduction 
and exemption/credit is best represented by a PD or an assurance game. There are further examples 
where other games are used to analyze issues of international taxation. Dehejia and Genschel (1999), 
for instance, model tax competition as a “battle of the sexes” game. In their view, it is not so much 
defection that prevents international cooperation in the field of international taxation but rather 
distributional issues that make cooperation “controversial” (Dehejia and Genschel, 1999: 1044f). 
Which game is in the end the most suitable depends on the precise issue that is being analyzed and 
on the assumptions made by the respective authors of each paper (Rixen, 2008: 37).  
There are some caveats to using the Game Theory model for the analysis of international 
taxation issues. Firstly, policy choices are typically more complex than simple binary choices as 
indicated in Game Theory models. However, as long as these choices may meaningfully be arrayed in 
one dimension, the strategic structure of the game remains the same (Snidal, 1985: 927f). Also 
increasing the number of the actors does not change the structure of the game; each additional actor 
simply adds one dimension (ibid: 929). The probably most important setback is that the Game Theory 
model  
 
“treat[s] states as goal-seeking actors with well-defined preferences implies an essentially 
realist (or neorealist) view of international politics” (ibid: 926).  
 
One should have this drawback in mind when using the Game Theory approach to 
international policy issues (see also Shaviro, 2007: 165) Still, the Game Theory framework yields 
beneficial insights by underlining the importance of the strategic aspects of interactions among 
states, and their impact on interstate cooperation (ibid: 941). Rixen’s approach below further 
addresses the unsatisfactory assumption Game Theory implicates (that governments are considered 
as unitary actors), and provides a solution to this dilemma. 
International tax policy between domestic interest groups and international  
structures  
Rixen (2011) sets up a framework to analyze the strategic structures of international double 
taxation and under-taxation combing Game Theory and Public Choice ideas. His framework rests on 
two assumptions: (i) Governments are assumed to maximize national welfare and need to gain the 
support of three domestic interest groups, namely labor, individual capital (i.e. wealthy citizens 
investing part of their wealth abroad), and corporate capital;13 (ii) Rixen differentiates between small 
                                                            
13 Rixen claims that the three domestic interest groups would support double taxation avoidance: Labor is not interested in 
international capital being taxed twice “as long as enough tax is paid at home”; both individual and corporate capital would 
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and big countries, arguing that they might pursue different policies in order to maximize national 
welfare.  
In Rixen’s game, governments have both a unilateral and a collective interest in alleviating 
international double taxation.14 Due to this structure, the alleviation of double taxation can be 
modeled as a “coordination game”. Conversely, depending on a country’s relative international 
investment position, small and big countries will have differing preferences with regards to the way 
double taxation is avoided. Net capital importers, typically small countries, have an interest in 
promoting source taxation, while net capital exporters, often big countries, rather prefer residence 
taxation. Rixen, consequently, perceives the structure of the “double tax avoidance game” as a 
“coordination game with a distributive conflict” (Rixen, 2011: 198).  
When international double taxation is to be prevented, cross-border income should be 
subject to single taxation. Yet, countries can benefit unilaterally from setting lower tax rates than 
others in order to attract international capital flows. Thus, tax competition constitutes the second 
stage in the tax game established by Rixen. He models the tax competition as an asymmetric PD.  
The positions of the three societal groups will depend on whether the issue is to prevent real 
tax competition, i.e. the shifting of economic activity to other jurisdictions, or virtual tax competition, 
which is solely about shifting paper-profits. Generally, there will be conflicting interests, and in the 
case of virtual tax competition, domestic corporate capital in the bigger country will attempt to 
prevent their government from effectively mitigating the problem of under-taxation. Due to the 
effective lobbying of corporate capital in large countries, under-taxation is not curtailed decidedly. In 
addition to this, and because of the differing interests of small and big countries, the countries will 
often fail to coordinate and successfully curb international tax avoidance and evasion (ibid: 220).  
In general, evidence supports the propositions made by this approach. Countries often 
struggle to agree on effective means to prevent international tax avoidance and evasion. A case in 
point is the OECD project on harmful tax competition, which has encountered many difficulties not 
only from large countries and also from small tax-havens, that actually benefit from the offering of 
very low tax rates (Rixen, 2011: 217; also see 4.4).  
5. Conclusion  
This article observed that the current international tax system and the theoretically 
“optimal” tax system diverge greatly. One reason for this discrepancy might be that politicians strive 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
undoubtedly not oppose international double tax relief and they would not care as to where to pay the remaining tax (p. 
201). 
14 According to Rixen (2011), the fact that all governments unilaterally provide relief of double taxation provides evidence 
for this proposition. 
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for other more dubious objectives rather than making tax rules that comply with the theoretical 
concepts of optimal taxation.  
In this article, the approaches used in the economic and legal literature to explain the 
motivations of the persons “making” international tax policy have been contrasted with some “real 
world” evidence. In this endeavor, this article has investigated how far (i) the benefit principle and 
the ability-to-pay principle, (ii) global efficiency norms, and (iii) national welfare may be the main 
objectives of consideration for politicians in charge of making international tax policy. Subsequently, 
the influence different societal groups may exert on the law making process have been examined in 
the light of the Public Choice Theory. Also the Game Theory framework has been presented, which 
can prove valuable in modeling strategic interactions of different countries in the international tax 
game.  
Not surprisingly, the article has illustrated that the making of international tax policy is 
affected by many different factors: both domestic pressure groups and the structure of the 
international tax system influence this process, along with politicians and bureaucrats that may strive 
to advance their personal goals rather than the welfare of their citizens. Considering the complexity 
of the conditions under which international tax policy is often made, it is not astonishing that 
international tax law deviates from the principles characterizing ideal taxation.  
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